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Abstract
There is a gap between the recommendations of the theory of second
degree price discrimination and the practices of firms that target consumer
segments with varying willingness to pay with two or more distinct tar-
iffs. We present a model where consumers’ private information is single
dimensional and the allocation rule is two-dimensional. In contrast to the
established result in nonlinear pricing, we find that the per-unit price may
be non-monotonic: low-demand consumers face a two-part tariff with a
per-unit price possibly below marginal cost, and even zero, whereas high-
demand consumers face tariffs with per-unit charges above marginal cost.
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bution, are faced with a quality restriction, quality being monotonically
increasing in type. Finally, we show that this practice increases welfare
due to increased consumption efficiency.
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1 Introduction
There is a wide gap between the recommendations one can draw from theoretical
models on second degree price discrimination and the actual practices of firms
that aim to target consumer segments with different willingness to pay with
two or more distinct tariffs. Attempting to bridge this gap, we present a model
where consumers’ private information is single dimensional and the allocation
rule is two-dimensional. Hence, we explore an extension of a simple two-part
pricing arrangement by assuming that the firm can observe a customer’s usage
of its service along more than one dimension.1 The firm offers a menu of two
part tariffs, where each tariff is characterized by a fixed fee, a uniform per
unit charge, and some quality restriction (a usage restriction, e.g., line speed or
calling circle).2 The quality restriction is intended to separate consumers with
different willingness to pay for the firm’s service, similar to the standard model
in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Deneckere and McAfee (1996). However, rather
than assuming inelastic demand, it is assumed that consumers have elastic
demand, as in Maskin and Riley (1984) and Oi (1971).
To illustrate the general idea, consider the strategy used in broadband
pricing. Users of broadband services have very diverse needs when it comes
to Internet surfing, e-mailing, music and video downloads, and high-quality
video and audio streaming, and this reflects their demand for speed and their
intensity of usage with respect to download/upload. While surfing the Internet
is slightly faster on a high-speed connection, high-quality video streaming will
perform badly on a low-speed connection. If low demand types are served with
a higher line speed this is valuable first of all because it frees up time to explore
further content on the Internet, and to some extent consume new high speed
services. However, the propensity to use free time to explore further content
is diminishing and increased line speed will eventually be of no use. For high
demand consumers a higher line speed is valuable primarily because it gives
access to a new series of services and contents that the consumer values highly.
Hence, consumers’ willingness to pay for access speed depends partly on which
1Matthews and Moore (1987) generalize one extension of the bench-mark model by assum-
ing that consumers’ private information is single dimensional, while the firm offers contracts
with two or more attributes (quality and warranty) in addition to the monetary payment from
consumer to the firm. Garc´ıa (2005) extends the results in Matthews and Moore (1987).
2Two part tariffs where each tariff consists of only a fixed fee and a per usage charge have
been studied in Oi (1971); Faulhaber and Panzar (1977); Goldman, Leland and Sibley (1984);
Sharkey and Sibley (1993), and Wilson (1993, chapter 6). Mirman and Sibley (1980) study
the problem in Goldman et al. (1984) in a multiproduct firm.
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services they use and partly on their usage intensity.
Table 1 shows an example. The broadband company Tiscali charges high-
demand consumers £24.99 for broadband at 512 kbps, while low-demand con-
sumers pay £10 less for the same speed, but on different terms, since they must
stay online less than 50 hours, or download less than 1 GB, per month. Another
example that is consistent with the framework in this paper is the widespread
practice of various kinds of calling circle tariffs, for instance “Friends and Fam-
ily” tariffs.3 Table 2 lists some additional examples from telecommunications.
Table 1: Pricing of broadband, Tiscali (UK, June 2004)
Product Downstream speed Cost per month (Pounds)
Broadbandx3 150 kbps 15.99, Free usage
Broadbandx5 256 kbps 19.99, Free usage
Broadbandx10 50 Hours 512 kbps 19.99, After 50 hours 2p per minute
Broadbandx10 1 GB 512 kbps 19.99, After 1 GB 2p per Mb
Broadbandx10 Unlimited 512 kbps 24.99, Free usage
The firm’s task is to design a menu of two part tariffs with appropriate fixed
fees, per unit charges, and usage restriction, in such a way that all consumers
find it individual rational to select the tariff that is in fact intended for his/her
type, given that consumers have private information about a one dimensional
characteristic. This is another way of saying that the solution to the problem
must obey the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation con-
straint. In the early days when ISDN was the sole access technology, price per
dial-up online minute was the sole instrument in addition to the fixed fee in the
firm’s pricing decision.4 The optimization problem was simplified by imposing
the “downward adjacent” incentive compatibility constraint, together with the
participation constraint for the lowest consumer type buying the product. The
simplified problem is the solution to the full problem under the condition that
the per unit charge is decreasing over the type space (monotonicity condition).
3Subscribers are billed according to aggregate minutes of calling to a restricted set of
network subscribers. Firms’ use of calling circle tariffs has received some attention in other
areas of economics literature as well. Wang and Wen (1998) consider a duopoly model with
demand side heterogeneity, where such pricing behavior enables a new firm to enter the market
despite the presence of consumer switching costs. Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) examine the
effects of discriminatory pricing on the negotiated interconnection agreements between rival
network operators. In a recent publication written independently of this study, Shi (2003)
study the use of calling circle tariffs from a social network theory perspective.
4This is not the full story since many telecom firms offered internet surfing (dialling the
ISP) at different rates contingent on the consumers choice of “Internet calling plans”, i.e.,
calling plans with a single number.
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Table 2: Examples of telecommunications services pricing (June 2004)
Company/Product Service restriction Pricing arrangement
Vodafone (UK)
Perfect Fit
Lower rates anytime
Lower rates daytime
Lower rates evening/weekend
Two-part tariffs
with inclusive minutes
Orange (UK)
Your Plan
Lower rates any network anytime
Lower rates Orange-Orange anytime
Lower rates Orange-Orange off-peak
Two-part tariffs
with inclusive minutes
O2 (UK) Lower rates anytime
Lower rates daytime/evening time
Two-part tariffs
with inclusive minutes
BT (UK)
Together 1,2,3
Low rate evening/weekend
Free calls evening/weekend
Free calls anytime
Two-part tariffs
Telenor (Norway)
Friends & Family
Lower rates on calls to mobile
Lower rates on national calls
Lower rates on international calls
Two-part tariffs
Tiscali (UK)
Dial-up internet access
Unlimited surfing anytime
Unlimited surfing daytime, weekdays
Unlimited surfing daytime all week
Flat rate
Per minute
outside hours
BT Broadband
512 kbps
Less than 15 GB monthly download
Upgrade to free download
Flat rate
BT Broadband
1Mb
Less than 30 GB monthly download
Upgrade to free download
Flat rate
In our model, the firm faces a slightly different problem. While holding
on to the assumption that the private information is single dimensional (for
instance, willingness to pay for viewing content on the internet), and that the
outside option for the consumer is type-independent, we assume that consumers’
willingness to pay is correlated, not only with one, but with two variables that
are observed by the firm.5 One is a quantity variable, and the other one is
some variable related to the quality of the service (e.g., line speed). We show
that introducing an additional instrument might change the incentive constraint
5Models where the firm aims to screen consumers according to multiple dimensions of un-
certainty soon become difficult to solve, partly because the incentive compatibility conditions
are frequently not only binding between adjacent types. Discrete models with fewer incen-
tive compatibility constraints can be tractable, Jensen (2001) model a discrete version of the
present model. Rochet and Stole (2003) gives a comprehensive survey of the literature related
to multidimensional screening. Rochet and Stole (2002) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001)
relax the assumption that the reservation utility is perfectly known by the firm and introduce
stochastic participation. The principal must induce both truthful information revelation and
voluntary participation. Both find that efficient two part tariffs may emerge as an equilib-
rium. Other extensions of the bench-mark models are to introduce more than one instrument
or more than one observable variable (see Matthews and Moore (1987); Sappington (1983);
Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey and Tirole (1988); Garc´ıa (2005)).
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and that we have to be more careful in using the simplified approach to profit
maximization. If consumers have a systematic incentive to understate their
private information, informational rent increases over the type space, and the
firm only has to be concerned about participation at the very lowest end of the
type space. While we show that the need to secure incentive compatibility does
not conflict with the need to ensure participation and that complete separation
between consumer types is reached, we show that the firm’s allocation rule may
not be monotonic along both dimensions. However, the allocation has to satisfy
a “weighed monotonicity constraint”. Especially, and in sharp contrast to the
existing literature, we show that the per unit charge may be below marginal cost
in the lower end of the type space, and that it may increase in some subinterval.
In this respect, our paper is close to Matthews and Moore (1987), which also
shows that the optimal contracts need not be monotonic in type. However, the
allocation in their model depend on consumers’ attitude towards risk. Garc´ıa
(2005) extend the non-monotonicity properties in Matthews and Moore (1987)
to a setup with quasi-linear preferences.
If we change the interpretation a little, the model can be used to analyze
nonlinear pricing and bundling in a multiproduct monopoly setting. Assum-
ing that the firm sells a very large number of products, the firm can bundle a
subset of the products and charge units within this product bundle according
to a distinct two-part tariff. In a model with unit demand, Bakos and Bryn-
jolfsson (1999) study the strategy of bundling a large number of information
goods (goods with zero or very low marginal costs of production) and selling
them for a fixed price. One of their findings is that the firm should offer a
menu of different bundles aimed at each market segment and practice price
discrimination when consumers’ tastes are positively correlated.6 Armstrong
(1999) studies optimal multiproduct nonlinear pricing when the firm offers a
very large number of products, applicable to telecommunications.7 When con-
sumers’ tastes are correlated across products, he find that a menu of two part
tariffs, each of which have prices proportional to marginal costs, can extract
6Since the literature on bundling to a large extent deals with a setting with only two
products and linear pricing, most is not relevant to our model.
7Multiproduct nonlinear pricing is also studied elsewhere. Mirman and Sibley (1980) con-
sider a multiproduct monopoly facing consumers who are differentiated by a single characteris-
tic, where the firm offers a menu of commodity bundles together with the price for the bundle.
Hence, Mirman and Sibley (1980) has similarities with our paper. Sibley and Srinagesh (1997)
explore the difference between screening the different dimensions of consumer types indepen-
dently by means of two-part tariffs and the alternative of bundling all taste parameters to
design a single two-part tariff. Miravete (2001) studies multidimensional screening where
different type components distinguish quality dimensions of products that can be aggregated.
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almost all available profits. However, Armstrong (1999) covers only the case
where all products are sold in all segments.
Section 2 presents the framework with usage pattern heterogeneity used in
this paper. Section 3 presents the results we obtain within this setting. Section
4 offers some concluding remarks.
2 A model with usage pattern heterogeneity
The market is served by a monopoly, and resale opportunities are absent.8 The
cost function is assumed to be linear, and the fixed cost is excluded from the
profit measure. There is a continuum of consumers on the demand side, having
heterogeneous and unobserved willingness to pay for the service in question.
Consumers also have heterogeneous usage patterns, and this can be observed by
the firm. Section 2.1 describes the details of the demand side of the model. If the
firm, say, for some exogenously given reason chooses not to restrict consumers’
mode of usage, the qualitative results are that the per unit price is set above
marginal cost for every consumer but the one with the highest willingness to
pay. The fixed fee increases and the per unit price decreases over the type space.
Hence, if the heterogeneity is very large the model can result in a situation where
some consumer segments face a high price cost margin, while other segments
are excluded from purchasing.
As the introduction suggests, demand side heterogeneity may come about
because different consumers use the service very differently. While some broad-
band subscribers only surf the Internet and read e-mails, services that perform
well on low line speed, others may use the connection to watch live video, which
requires high line speed to perform reasonably well. Just as call minutes to one
network node (your boyfriend, for example) is a bad substitute for call minutes
to a different network node (say, your mother), a low speed connection is a bad
substitute for a high speed connection if one wants to watch live video. If the
firm offers a tariff with a restricted line speed it restricts the consumers’ mode
of usage since they will not have access to all available content on the internet.9
8Although telecommunications is subject to competition almost all over the world, we do
not add imperfect competition to the framework. The reason for this is simply that it adds
too much complexity (see Rochet and Stole (2003) and Stole (2005)).
9Vodafone has recently introduced a tariff option under the name “At Home”. On this
tariff the usage charge is lower when the consumer make calls from the home zone (some radio
coverage area around the home or the office). Hence, consumers’ mode of usage is restricted
since full mobility is possible otherwise.
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In our framework then, consumers’ willingness to pay for the service depends
partly on their usage patterns and partly on their usage intensity.
We assume that consumers’ usage pattern is captured by a conditional dis-
tribution function H(s|θ) over a continuous variable s ∈ [0, 1], with a unimodal
probability density function h(s|θ). The usage pattern then is defined as each
consumer type’s intensity over the various modes of usage s (e.g. line speed).10
Consumers’ usage intensity depends on a single dimensional and unobserved
demand parameter θ. The conditional distribution function is derived from a
cumulative bivariate distribution H(s, θ) on s ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [1, 2], with a mar-
ginal cumulative distribution F (θ). Both distributions are prior knowledge for
the firm. The assumption that high demand types have a more dispersed usage
pattern implies the further assumption that the distribution H(s|θ′) first-order
stochastically dominates the distribution H(s|θ′′) if θ′′ > θ′. That is, consumers
with higher quantity preferences do also have higher preferences for “quality”,
and usage mode is an intrinsic part of consumers’ preferences. One implica-
tion of this assumption is that a price increase will not change the cumulative
distribution across usage modes, even though a price increase will change in-
dividual consumption levels across all usage modes. This implication may be
questioned. However, there is no obvious alternative assumption – i.e., that the
usage pattern will be more concentrated or more dispersed when the per unit
charge increases.11 Appendix C describes the family of distribution function
that our conclusions are derived from.
2.1 Utility
The subutility of a consumer of type θ from consuming q units of the service at
some given usage mode s is given by the following subutility function
u(q, θ; s) = θq −
1
2h(s|θ)
q2, (1)
10For instance, a telecom firm keeps records of each subscriber’s dispersion of calls in the
network, i.e., number of call minutes to all available network nodes, and a mobile company
can observe the location a call is made from (mobile stations). The firm could also learn about
consumers’ usage patterns from market research and market surveys. A rationale behind the
difference in information held by the firm can also be that regulations prohibit the firm from
giving exclusive offers so that consumers must self select tariffs. However, it can still be a
legal pricing strategy to offer tariffs with restrictions on the mode of usage. Accordingly, we
assume that the usage pattern is specific to each individual consumer type θ, and that there
is a correlation between θ and the usage pattern.
11The same assumption is made in Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997).
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where h(s|θ) is the conditional probability distribution function of s on [0, 1]
given θ, with a conditional cumulative distribution function H(s|θ), h′s(s|θ) ≤ 0
and H ′θ(s|θ) ≤ 0.
12 The subutility function takes into account that modes of
usage with higher usage intensity contributes more to aggregate utility than
modes of usage with lower usage intensity, and that different consumers have
different usage patterns.
Each consumer is billed according to a two part tariff T = {E, p, s}, where
E ≥ 0 is a fixed entry fee, p ≥ 0 is a charge per unit of usage, and s ∈ [0, 1]
is a restriction on the mode of usage on this particular tariff. The case with
no restriction on the mode of usage is normalized to s = 1. Hence if s = 1,
the mode of usage is not restricted at all , and if s = 0 the consumer is de
facto prevented from using the service. If 0 < s < 1 the consumer can enjoy
consumption on every mode of usage up to s. If a consumer of type θ finds it
individual rational to pay the fixed fee E, the price is the same across all usage
modes and equal to p per unit of usage. The volume at each mode of usage
maximizes the quasilinear subutility function u(q, s, θ) − pq. Hence, expected
quantity demand at some given s is
q(p, s, θ) = (θ − p)h(s|t) ≡ x(p, θ)h(s|θ). (2)
Aggregate consumption on all usage modes up to s is given by
Q(p, s, θ) =
∫ s
0
(θ − p)h(z|θ)dz = x(p, θ)H(s|θ), (3)
q(·) and Q(·) are both nonincreasing in p, while Q(·) is also nondecreasing in
s. The signs of the other derivatives of q(·) and Q(·) depends on the sched-
ule {p(θ), s(θ)}. When each subutility function is quasilinear, the aggregate
demand function appears to maximize aggregate consumer surplus, and a con-
sumer’s gross surplus measured in monetary terms is represented by the area
under the demand function.13 We can write the indirect utility for a consumer
12We simplify the notation in the following manner: If we have a function, say, f(x, z) we
use the notation fx for the derivative of f(x, z) with respect to x. If there is no ambiguity
about the arguments of a function, these will be omitted.
13We abstract from the fact that some consumers may have positive utility even in the case
when consumption is zero. In the case of broadband usage, this is not at all problematic. In
the case of fixed or mobile telephony, the case is different since a consumer may want a network
connection in order to receive calls only, or to be able to make emergency calls. Oren, Smith
and Wilson (1982) and Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997) study nonlinear pricing under the presence
of demand externalities, for instance when the benefit a consumer receives in a communication
network depends on his or her access to communication partners and increases with the size
of the network.
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type that is charged according to two part tariff {E, p, s} as
V (E, p, s, θ) =
∫ θ
p
x(z, θ)H(s|θ)dz − E (4)
≡ ω(p, θ)H(s|θ)− E ≡ v(p, s, θ)− E.
By Roy’s identity we have
Vp(·) = vp(p, s, θ) = ωp(p, θ)H(s|θ) = −x(p, θ)H(s|θ).
Consumers will buy if there exists a tariff {E, p, s} such that V (E, p, s, θ) ≥
0. If not, they are better off not buying. Furthermore, we will assume that
the outside option is the same for all consumers and normalize this to zero.
The individual rationality constraint (participation constraint) is given by the
constraint∫ θ
p
x(z, θ)H(s|θ)dz − E ≥ 0. (5)
Figure 1 illustrates the individual rationality constraint for two different
types θ1 and θ2. A reduction in s has an adverse effect on consumers’ participa-
tion constraint, and the effect is more severe for high demand types compared
to low demand types.
The indirect utility is convex in (E, p) and the marginal rate of substitution
between the per unit price and the fixed fee, MRSpE , is given by
dE
dp
= −xH ≤ 0. (6)
Hence, the slope of V (E, p, s, θ) is negative and the consumer is willing to pay
a higher fixed fee against a reduction in the per unit charge.
The marginal rate of substitution varies with s and θ.
d2E
dpds
= −xh ≤ 0, and
d2E
dpdθ
= −
(
xθH + xHθ
)
≷ 0.
The slope of a consumer type’s indifference curve is steeper the higher is
s and a restriction on s causes a negative shift in V (E, p, s, θ). Since Hθ(·) is
negative, we cannot be certain that the marginal rate of substitution increases
with θ for any profile s(θ).
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IR1
IR2
p
E
Figure 1: Participation constraints with (dashed lines) and without (solid lines)
a usage restriction for two different consumer types (IR1 for type θ1 and IR2
for θ2).
2.2 Welfare maximization
With constant returns to scale technology the first best solution to the problem
is obtained by maximizing social welfare as the sum of consumer and produce
surplus with respect to p and s for each θ.
max
p(θ)≥0 s(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ
p(θ)
x(z, θ)H(s(θ)|θ)dz + (p(θ)− c)x(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ),
which yields first order conditions(
p(θ)−c
)
xpH(s(θ)|θ) = 0 and
(
ω(p(θ), θ)+(p(θ)−c)x(p(θ), θ)
)
h(s(θ)|θ) = 0.
The two above conditions can only hold simultaneously if s(θ) = 1 and p(θ) = c.
2.3 Profit maximization
The firm maximizes profit under two constraints. The individual rationality
constraint states that consumers must receive at least the utility they can obtain
from spending their money on other goods or services, hence
V (θ) = V (E(θ), p(θ), s(θ), θ) ≥ 0. (7)
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The other constraint on the firm’s maximization problem is the incentive com-
patibility constraint
V (E(θ), p(θ), s(θ), θ) ≥ V (E(θ), p(θ′), s(θ′), θ), (8)
V (θ, θ) ≥ V (θ, θ′).
For continuous profiles p(θ) and s(θ), the incentive compatibility constraint is
found by solving
θ ∈ arg max
θ′
(
ω(p(θ′), θ)H(s(θ′)|θ)− E(θ′)
)
.
Hence, the firm may increase the fixed fee if the per unit price p(θ) is reduced,
or if the allowance s(θ) is increased.
−x(p, θ)H(s|θ)p′(θ) + ω(p, θ)h(s|θ)s′(θ) = E′(θ). (9)
The second order condition for incentive compatibility requires the following
condition (differentiating condition (9))
d2V
(dθ′)2
(θ, θ) ≤ 0 ⇒
d2V
dθ′dθ
(θ, θ) ≥ 0. (10)
The last condition in (10) can be stated as (dropping all functions arguments)14
−
{
xθH + xHθ
}dp
dθ
+
{
ωθh+ ωhθ
}ds
dθ
≥ 0, (11)
which can also be written as( Vθp
Vθp + Vθs
)dp
dθ
+
( Vθs
Vθp + Vθs
)ds
dθ
≥ 0.
In this case, incentive compatibility does not longer require that p(θ)
is monotonically decreasing. Instead the second order condition requires a
weighted monotonicity constraint to hold (see Garc´ıa (2005)). However, one of
the allocations must be monotonically decreasing (p) or increasing (s) in type.
If Vθp > 0 and Vθs > 0, sufficient conditions for global incentive compatibility
are that p(θ) is monotonically nonincreasing in θ, and s(θ) is monotonically
nondecreasing in θ. However, we can allow other profiles for p(θ) and s(θ) as
long as the positive term outweighs the negative. A consumer will not choose
14If the per unit price is the single instrument with tariffs {E(θ), p(θ)}, global incentive
compatibility can be replaced by the local downward incentive compatibility constraint given
that p(θ) is nonincreasing together with the single crossing condition ωpθ ≤ 0.
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a tariff with a lower per unit price if the restriction in the mode of usage is
sufficiently severe. Since Hθ and hθ can both be negative it is neither sufficient
nor necessary that p(θ) being nonincreasing and s(θ) being nondecreasing in θ.
If we ignore the second order condition for global incentive compatibility
(11) for the moment, letting local incentive compatibility be the only binding
constraint, we can apply the envelope theorem and write
∂V (θ)
∂θ
= vθ(p(θ), s(θ), θ).
Hence, the informational rent can be expressed as
V (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
vθ(p(u), s(u), u)du. (12)
If the informational rent in (12) is increasing we know that consumers
always obtain positive consumer surplus if they choose a contract that gives
nonnegative surplus for some lower type. Therefore, the only binding individual
rationality constraint will be for the lowest type. Otherwise, the firm sacrifices
profit if it leaves consumers with higher utility than necessary. Hence, if V ′(θ) >
0,∀θ the firm maximizes profit subject to (12) and the individual rationality
constraint for the very lowest type
V (θ) = V (E(θ), p(θ), s(θ), θ) = 0. (13)
On the other hand, since Hθ(·) is negative, the informational rent is not
unambiguously increasing in θ, and we cannot rule out the possibility of coun-
tervailing incentives. Under countervailing incentives the individual rationality
constraint can bind for other types than θ.15 In our case, V ′(θ) is given by
Vθ = ωθH + ωHθ ≷ 0.
The first term is the marginal valuation for consumption up to s, which
is increasing in θ. The second part takes into account that higher types have
higher probability weight on higher s (the assumption about first-order stochas-
tic dominance).
The monopoly maximizes the sum of fixed fees and variable profits, subject
to individual rationality and incentive compatibility. With respect to incentive
15Countervailing incentives can arise if the individual rationality constraint is type depen-
dent, or if the sign of the informational rent is ambiguous. See Lewis and Sappington (1989);
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995); Jullien (2000)
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compatibility, we will assume that the solution satisfies V ′(θ) > 0, and that the
second order condition (11) is satisfied. Hence, we maximize the profit subject
to (12) and (13). After we have obtained a solution it is necessary to check
that the second order condition for global incentive compatibility as well as the
assumption V ′(θ) > 0 are in fact satisfied.
The firm’s profit is given by
max
E(θ),p(θ),s(θ)
∫ θ¯
θ
{
E(θ) + (p(θ)− c)x(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)
}
f(θ)dθ (14)
s.t.
V (θ) = 0 and V (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
vθ(p(u), s(u), u)du
E(θ) ∈ [0,∞), p(θ) ∈ [0,∞), s(θ) ∈ [0, 1].
Substituting for E(θ) from the participation constraint, and integrating by
part gives the profit as (see Appendix A)
max
p(θ)≥0,s(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ¯
θ
{
ω
(
p(θ), θ
)
H(s(θ)|θ) +
(
p(θ)− c
)
x(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)
−
(1− F (θ))
f(θ)
(
ωθ(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)+ (15)
ω(p(θ), θ)Hθ(s(θ)|θ)
)}
f(θ)dθ.
The maximization of profit with respect to p(·) and s(·) requires that the
integral in (15) is maximized with respect to p(θ) and s(θ) for all θ, subject to
the constraints p(θ) > 0 and s(θ) ∈ [0, 1]. The optimality conditions for this
Kuhn-Tucker problem are in the Appendix B.16
3 Optimal pricing policy
Marginal profit at θ with respect to price is given by
(p− c)xpH − (1− F )
(
ωθpH + ωpHθ
)
= ∂W
∂p
− (1− F ) d
dp
V ′(θ).
Social surplus increases in p as long as p > c. However, due to private infor-
mation the monopolist is not able to appropriate the entire surplus, but has to
16Since the constraints are linear it is sufficient that Π(p, s; θ, c) is concave in (p, s) for an
interior solution to solve the problem. However, the profit expression is not in general concave
and we have to check that the solution to the first order conditions is indeed a maximum.
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leave consumers with an information rent. If (1− F ) d
dp
V ′(θ) < 0 the marginal
information rent decreases with p and the monopolist will increase the per unit
charge above the first best level p = c for all types but the very highest one (θ¯).
The opposite will be true if (1− F ) d
dp
V ′(θ) > 0, and the marginal information
rent increases as p is increased. If d
dp
V ′(θ) > 0 it can even be the case that
p = 0 is optimal in some parts of the type space.
Marginal profit with respect to p can also be expressed as{
− (p− c) + (1− F ) + (1− F )xHθ
H
}
H.
Since ∂Π
∂p
∣∣
s=1
= −(p− c) + (1− F ) it is clear that the price will always be
below the monopoly price with p as the single instrument. The isolated welfare
effect from a usage restriction on the firm’s per unit price is positive.
Marginal profit at θ with respect to the usage restriction s is given by
(p− c)xh+ wh− (1− F ) (ωθh+ ωhθ) =
∂W
∂s
− (1− F ) d
ds
V ′(θ).
Again, the sum of the first two terms evaluates the effect on social surplus
at θ from an increase in s. In addition, setting s below the first best level will
increase or decrease the monopolist’s ability to appropriate social surplus at a
given p because it affects the marginal information rent. Notice that marginal
profit is zero at s = 0 and s = 1. If d
ds
V ′(θ) < 0 ∀ θ, p, the marginal information
rent increases as s is decreased and s = 1 is certainly optimal. In the opposite
case, when d
ds
V ′(θ) > 0 ∀ θ, p it will be optimal to restrict s for all types but
the very highest one.
If an interior solution with p(θ) > 0 and 0 < s(θ) < 1, p(θ) exists, this
must satisfy
p− c = (1− F )
(
1 + xHθ
H
)
. (16)
According to (16) the per unit price can be above or below marginal cost
depending on the sign of the term (1 + xHθ
H
), but the price-cost margin will
never exceed 1−F for those consumer types being served. In the case with p as
the only instrument, the price-cost margin is given by the term 1− F . Hence,
introduction of a second instrument reduces the price-cost distortion for those
consumer types being served. The following propositions are derived under the
assumption that the conditional probability function H(s|θ) is derived from a
bivariate Beta distribution with a joint probability function g(s, θ). The shape
of h(s|θ) depends on the demand parameter θ, the lower is θ the larger is the
mass for low s. The distribution is defined in the Appendix C.
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Proposition 1 (Efficiency at the top) The consumer type with the very
highest willingness to pay (θ = θ¯) is offered a two-part tariff with p = c to-
gether with s = 1. Every other consumer type is offered a two part tariff with a
price-cost distortion together with a mode of usage restriction.
Proposition (1) is proved in Appendix D.1. We recognize the “no distortion
at the top” result not only with respect to the usage charge, but also with
respect to the mode of usage restriction. Also, if consumers with lower demand
do not have a significantly different usage pattern, the firm will sort consumers
via the usage charge rather than restricting consumers’ mode of usage, and we
will have pooling along s. Notice that the combination of s = 1 and p − c =
(1 − F ) will only happen at the very highest end of the distribution of θ.
Every other consumer will face a distortion, either via the usage charge, via a
restriction on usage, or both.
Proposition 2 (Free usage) If the demand side heterogeneity is sufficiently
large, together with c ≤ min
{
eθ
2 , 2 − θ˜
}
, consumers in the interval [1 + c2 , θ˜]
will be offered a tariff with a mode of usage restriction (s < 1) together with
a zero usage charge (p = 0). The larger is the heterogeneity in consumers’
mode of usage, the larger is θ˜. The larger is the marginal cost, the smaller is
θ˜. However, the tariff is incentive compatible only if c ≤ θ2 . Further, it satisfies
the participation constraint only if c ≤ 2− θ.
Proposition 2 is proved in the Appendix D.2. This result shows that it
might be an optimal strategy to sort consumers solely via the usage restriction,
and we will have pooling along p in the lower end of the type space. If the
heterogeneity in consumers’ mode of usage is large, the cost of restricting low
demand types mode of usage (in terms of the effect on their willingness to pay)
is low compared with the gain that can be achieved by the reduction in the
information rent paid to higher types. Therefore, it might even be profitable
to offer tariffs with free usage in low demand segments, and restore incentive
compatibility via higher usage restrictions instead.
Proposition 3 (Market coverage) Every consumer with demand parameter
θ > 1+ c2 will consume a strictly positive quantity. The entire market is covered
if c = 0.
(i) In the case that p > 0, the marginal consumer that finds it just individual
rational to pay the fixed fee is given by θ = 1 + c2 .
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(ii) In the case that p = 0, the firm achieves nonnegative profit by serving
consumer types θ ≥ 1 + c2
Proposition (3) is proved in the Appendix D.3. If the per unit price is
the only available instrument it is easy to verify that the firm will serve con-
sumer types in [1 + c2 , θ¯]. It may seem a little surprising that the monopolist
is not inclined to serve more consumers when it gets control over an additional
instrument. Restricting s enables the firm to reveal information about θ, but
revealing this information has a cost side. For a given per unit charge a low
s restricts low demand types’ willingness to pay. Because the firm can com-
pensate low demand types for this restriction by reducing the per unit price,
the firm finds it profitable to reduce s. In designing the optimal use of the two
instruments, the firm finds it unprofitable to increase market coverage.
Proposition 4 (Interior solution) Consumers with demand parameter θ ∈
[θ˜, θ¯〉 is confronted with a per unit price p = c + (1 − F )
(
1 + xHθ
H
)
< 1 − F ,
together with a usage restriction 0 < s < 1.
Proposition (4) is proved in the Appendix D.4, except for θ˜ which is defined
in Proposition 2. In the case with p as the only instrument the price-cost margin
is given by the term 1−F . Hence, introduction of a second instrument reduces
the price-cost distortion.
Finally, turning attention to welfare considerations, it is clear that the
monopoly solution departs from the full information solution, except for the
very highest type θ¯, and that the monopolist serves too few consumers relative
to the full information solution. However, the relevant standard of comparison
is not welfare maximization under full information, but a second best solu-
tion where welfare is maximized subject to informational asymmetry. Another
standard of comparison is the bench-mark solution where a monopoly does not
restrict usage via s at all, but only via the usage charge p. There are two po-
tential sources of welfare gains due to quality degradation in this framework.
First, consumers gain if overall efficiency in consumption increases. Second, if
introducing quality degradation induces the firm to serve consumers it would
otherwise exclude, these consumers’ surpluses will increase. Proposition 5 and
6 below summarizes the welfare effects of the firm’s use of mode of usage re-
strictions by comparing the outcome under profit maximization to the outcome
in a second-best welfare optimum.
The maximum second-best welfare in our context is found by maximizing
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the unweighed social welfare under asymmetric information subject to a break-
even constraint Π ≥ 0. This gives the Lagrangian (dependent on θ)
L = (1 + λ)
[
ω
(
p, θ
)
H(s|θ) +
(
p− c
)
x(p, θ)H(s|θ)
]
− λ (1− F )
[
ωθ(p, θ)H(s|θ) + ω(p, θ)Hθ(s|θ)
]
. (17)
The first order conditions remains the same as with profit maximization
as the objective, except that (1− F ) is replaced with λ1+λ(1− F ), λ being the
shadow price for public funding. First we state the second-best allocation in
Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 (Second best allocation) The following properties charac-
terize a second best allocation where a social planner maximizes the sum of
consumer surplus and profit, under the restriction that the firm breaks even:
(i) No distortion at the top: p(θ¯) = c and s(θ¯) = 1
(ii) Free usage is optimal only if λ is very large, given that the heterogeneity
in consumers mode of usage is large as well. Then p = 0 is optimal for
θ < θ˜W where θ˜W ≪ θ˜.
(iii) Market coverage: Consumers with demand parameter θ ∈ [1 + c2 −
2−c
2(2λ+1) , 2] consume a strictly positive quantity. If c <
1
2 it is optimal
to cover the entire market. If c = 23 it is optimal to cover the entire
market given that λ ≤ 12 .
(iv) Consumers with demand parameter θ ∈ [θ˜W , 2〉 is confronted with a per
unit price p = c + λ1+λ(1 − F )
(
1 + xHθ
H
)
< 1 − F , together with a usage
restriction s < 1.
See the Appendix D.5 for a proof. From Proposition 5 it is clear that
two part tariffs with mode of usage restrictions welfare dominates two part
tariffs that sort consumers solely via the usage charge. It is also evident that
the monopoly serves too few consumers relative to the second best allocation.
Further, if restrictions in consumers’ mode of usage is an effective means for
rent extraction, the monopoly sets s and p too low relative to the second best.
Since market coverage remains unchanged, welfare gains arise only if overall
consumption efficiency increases. Each consumer’s aggregate consumption level
increases in s and p, hence, welfare increases if the net effect on aggregate
consumption is positive.
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Proposition 6 (Welfare gains) Introducing mode of usage restriction in a
monopoly with two part tariffs increases the welfare of every consumer being
served. That is Q(p(θ), s(θ), θ) > Q(c + 2 − θ, 1, θ) ∀ θ ∈ [1 + c2 , 2). Since the
market coverage is [1 + c2 , 2] in any case, increased consumption efficiency is
the only source of welfare gains.
The Appendix D.5 provide a sketch for the proofs of Propositions 5 and
6. The Propositions show that although the monopoly will exaggerate the
magnitude of the distortions, the direction of the distortions is in line with
the second best. Especially, a pricing policy with mode of usage restriction
and below cost pricing is preferable. By degrading quality the firm becomes
better informed about consumers’ privately known demand parameter θ. This
enables the firm to capture a larger fraction of the social surplus and leads to
a reduction in the price-cost margin for all consumers. The other side of this
is that consumers are served with insufficient quality, and will therefore reduce
their consumption. However, by further reductions in the price-cost margin
the firm can to some extent compensate low demand types for this. If quality
degradation is sufficiently effective in this respect, the price-cost margin might
even be negative in the lower end of the type space. As to the second source
of welfare gains, Proposition 3 shows that market coverage might increase, and
that market coverage never decreases. Figure 2 show the welfare and profit
maximizing choice s(θ) for c = 0.2, λ = 0.3 and b = {4, 5.5, 7}.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines a firm’s incentive to degrade it’s service along a vertical
quality dimension when the firm offers a continuum of two part tariffs, and
shows how the two forms of usage restrictions interact in the screening analy-
sis. Hence, we combine the insights from Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin
and Riley (1984). We show that the “no distortion at the top” result is pre-
served in both instruments. Since the intention behind a distortion in per-unit
charges and quality levels is to restrict the informational rent to higher types,
by restricting the number of units the can claim informational rent on, the main
insights are not new. However, the results contradict one of the most established
insights in nonlinear pricing, that the per-unit charge should be monotonically
decreasing over the type space. We find that allocation of quality is monotonic
in type, while per usage charge might be non-monotonic. What happens is that
mode of usage restrictions are used to separate consumers, partly in combina-
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Figure 2: The profit and welfare maximizing choice of s(θ) given three different
assumptions about the demand side heterogeneity with respect to mode of usage
(c = 0.2, λ = 0.3).
tion with distortions in per unit charges. However, if imposing the mode of
usage restriction is a very efficient instrument, the monopoly might prefer to
use only this instrument heavily in some segments, and rather compensate low
demand types for large restrictions by offering tariffs with free usage. In the
case that both instruments are used in combination to achieve sorting, they are
both monotonic. If the firm relies on mode of usage restriction alone, per unit
charges are typically non-monotonic, while the usage restriction is monotoni-
cally increasing in type.
In comparison, a social planner maximizing second best welfare, defined as
maximizing the unweighed social welfare under asymmetric information subject
to a break-even constraint, will indeed find it optimal to distort both allocation
rules, but not to the same extent as the profit maximizing monopoly. The
monopoly is likely to use mode of usage restriction alone, and to an excessive
degree, and to balance this by setting lower per usage charges in low demand
segments. The two instruments aim at the same objective, which is to restrict
the consumption level in low demand segments below the efficient level. As
in all screening models, this is done, not really to restrict consumption in low
demand segments, but to hurt high demand consumers if they choose a tariff
with a low price.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the profit expression
The firm’s profit is given by
max
E(θ),p(θ),s(θ)
∫ θ¯
θ
{
E(θ) + (p(θ)− c)x(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)
}
f(θ)dθ
s.t.
V (θ) = 0 and V (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
vθ(p(u), s(u), u)du
E(θ) ∈ [0,∞), p(θ) ∈ [0,∞), s(θ) ∈ [0, 1]
Substituting for E(θ) from the participation constraint gives
max
p(θ)≥0,s(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ¯
θ
{
ω(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)−
∫ θ
θ
vθ(p(u), s(u), u)du
+ (p(θ)− c)x(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)
}
f(θ)dθ
Next, after integrating by parts we obtain the firm’s profit as
max
p(θ)≥0,s(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ¯
θ
{
ω(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)− (1− F (θ))(vθ(p(θ), s(θ), θ))
+ (p(θ)− c)x(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)
}
f(θ)dθ
and we can now write
max
p(θ)≥0,s(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ¯
θ
{
ω
(
p(θ), θ
)
H(s(θ)|θ) +
(
p(θ)− c
)
x(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)
− (1−F (θ))
f(θ)
(
ωθ(p(θ), θ)H(s(θ)|θ)+ (A.1)
ω(p(θ), θ)Hθ(s(θ)|θ)
)}
f(θ)dθ
B Optimality conditions
Maximizing the term under the integral in Π(p, s; θ, c) in (A.1) subject to the
conditions on p(θ) and s(θ) yields the following complementary slackness con-
ditions for the Kuhn-Tucker problem
∂Π
∂p
≤ 0, p ≥ 0, p
∂Π
∂p
= 0, (B.1)
∂Π
∂s
− µ ≤ 0, s ≥ 0, s(
∂Π
∂s
− µ) = 0, (B.2)
s ≤ 1, µ ≥ 0, µ(1− s) = 0, (B.3)
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where
∂Π
∂p
= −(p− c)ωppH − (1− F )(ωθpH + ωpHθ), (B.4)
∂Π
∂s
= (p− c)xh− (1− F )(ωθh+ ωhθ) + ωh. (B.5)
and µ is the multiplier for the constraint s ≤ 1.
If an interior solution exists this is given by a pricing policy with 0 < p∗ <
1 − F together with 0 < s∗ < 1, and ∂Π
∂p
(p∗, s∗; c) = ∂Π
∂s
(p∗, s∗; c) = 0. Notice
that ∂Π
∂s
= 0 if s = 0 or s = 1, independent of p.
• Second order conditions
The signs of the second order derivatives of the profit function cannot be
determined in general. Hence, sufficient conditions for profit maximization must
be evaluated in each case.
C Bivariate distribution
Let a bivariate distribution be defined by the standard Beta distribution with
parameters α and β on the support [0, 1]. Let α = 2 and β(θ) ≥ 2. The
bivariate probability function is then
g(s, θ) =

s(1−s)(β(θ)−1)
B(2,β(θ)) if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,
0 otherwise,
and the bivariate cumulative density function is
G(s, θ) =

R s
0 t(1−t)
(β(θ)−1)dt
B(2,β(θ)) if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,
0 otherwise.
assuming β′(θ) < 0, β′′(θ) ≤ 0, B(α, β) is the Beta function. β(θ) determines
the shape of the distribution, the higher is β(θ) (lower is θ) the larger is the
mass for low s. For w = 2 the distribution is symmetric around the expectation
s = 12 . Otherwise, the distribution is skewed with expectation s <
1
2 .
The marginal pdf over θ is
f(θ) =
∫ 1
0
g(s, θ)ds = 1.
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Hence, the conditional probability distribution is given by
h(s|θ) =
g(s, θ)
f(θ)
= g(s, θ)
Consumers’ taste parameter θ is uniform on a unit interval [1, 2]. As to the
shape of the conditional probability function we assume that this is given by
β(θ) = 2+ b(2− θ), thus β(2) = 2, and β(1) = 2+ b. The greater is b the larger
is the difference in consumers’ usage patterns.
The conditional cdf H(s|θ) is continuous, and the conditional pdf h(s|θ) is
unimodal, positive and integrable on the support [0, 1], h(s|θ), lims→0 h(s|θ) =
lims→1 h(s|θ) = 0.
The conditional pdf and the conditional cdf will also satisfy the following
Hθ =
∂H(s|θ)
∂θ
< 0, ∂
∂θ
(
Hθ
H
)
≤ 0, ∂
∂θ
(
hθ
h
)
≤ 0,
Hs = h(s|θ) > 0,
∂
∂s
(
Hθ
H
)
≥ 0, ∂
∂s
(
hθ
h
)
≥ 0.
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Figure 3: Conditional probability distributions for θ = 1, 1.5, 2.
D Proof of Propositions 1–4
D.1 Proof of Proposition 1
• First order conditions for θ = θ¯
The first order condition with respect to p is given by −(p − c)H = 0. Hence,
we must have p = c at θ = θ¯. The first order condition with respect to s reduces
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to wh. This is positive whenever s ∈ (0, 1). Hence, s = 1 is the only possible
choice that satisfies the first order conditions at θ¯.
• When will the constraint s = 1 be binding?
If s = 1 is binding we must have that ∂Π
∂s
≥ 0 evaluated at p− c = 1−F = 2−θ
and s = 1. In addition it must also be the case that ∂
2Π
∂s2
≤ 0 for p− c = 2− θ
and s = 1. However, since both ∂Π
∂s
= ∂
2Π
∂s2
= 0 we do not know whether s = 1 is
a local maximum or a local minimum. Evaluating marginal profit with respect
to s at p− c = 2− θ gives
∂Π
∂s
= 12x
2h
(
1− (2− θ)hθ
h
)
.
Here, it is the case that hθ
h
is negative as s approaches zero, and infinitely
positive as s approaches 1. For s = 0 and s = 1 we have ∂Π
∂s
= 0. For θ 6= 2,
∂Π
∂s
= 0 for some 0 < s < 1. Since Π(0, c+2−θ) = 0 and Π(1, c+2−θ) > 0, s = 1
is optimal for θ = 2. For every other θ there exists a stationary point s 6= 0, 1.
If profit is concave at this point (say sˆ(θ)) we know that Π(sˆ, c + 2 − θ) >
Π(1, c+ 2− θ), and s = 1 is not optimal. The second order derivative is given
by
∂2Π
∂s2
= 12x
2hs
(
1− (2− θ)hθ
h
)
− 12x
2h(2− θ)
[
hθ
h
]′
s
.
Since the last term is positive, it is easy to confirm that profit is concave at
least close to sˆ(θ).
The second order condition for global incentive compatibility is given by
xθ
dp
dθ
≥ 0,
which is satisfied. Since x > 0 we also know that V ′(θ) > 0. This completes
the proof of Proposition 1.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 2
• When will the constraint p = 0 be binding
For p = 0 to be a binding constraint it must be the case that ∂Π
∂p
< 0. Marginal
profit with respect to p evaluated at p = 0 is given by
∂Π
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=0
= cH + (1− F )(H + θHθ).
By inspection, it is clear that the constraint cannot be binding for s = 1 and
θ = 2.
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We know that s is determined according to (B.5), say that this defines
a function s′(θ), which is increasing in θ. Hence, if both the condition that
∂Π
∂p
(s′(θ), p) is negative when p approaches 0, and that ∂Π
∂s
(s, 0) is negative for
s > s′(θ), setting p = 0 is indeed optimal. Otherwise, the monopolist will
increase s and it is less likely p = 0 is optimal. The two conditions states
−Hθ
H
≥
1
θ
(
1 +
c
2− θ
)
(D.1)
−hθ
h
≤
1
θ
(
2−
θ − 2c
2− θ
)
=
1
θ
(
1 +
c
2− θ
−
2θ − 2− c
2− θ
)
(D.2)
Let (D.1) when it is binding define a function s1(θ) and (D.2) define a function
s2(θ). If s1(θ) ≥ s2(θ), then p = 0 is the optimal choice.
The left hand sides in (D.1) and (D.2) are identical, positive and finite,
as s approaches zero.17 Further,
[
−Hθ
H
]
and
[
−hθ
h
]
are both lower for lower
demand side heterogeneity with respect to mode of usage, and are also from our
assumptions decreasing in θ. Hence, if demand side heterogeneity in consumers’
mode of usage is sufficiently large, we expect that both conditions are satisfied
at least in some interval in the lower end of the type space, and that s1 > s2
in this interval. On the other hand, if θ is close to 2 the right hand side
in (D.1) approaches ∞, while the right hand side in (D.2) approaches −∞.
Since lims→1
[
−Hθ
H
]
= 0, while lims→1
[
−hθ
h
]
= −∞, we can conclude that
limθ→2 s1(θ) < 1 and limθ→2 s2(θ) = 1 and that p = 0 cannot bind at θ¯.
Since both d
ds
[
−Hθ
H
]
≤ 0 and d
ds
[
−hθ
h
]
≤ 0, while the right hand sides are
are unchanged, if a solution to (D.1) and (D.2) exists s1(θ) and s2(θ) are unique.
However, if c is sufficiently large, a nonnegative solution to (D.2) might fail to
exist for low values of θ. The firm will serve these consumers with s = 0 (de
facto exclusion). If a nonnegative solution to (D.1) fail to exist, the constraint
cannot be binding at all.
The slopes of s1 and s2 are given by
ds1
dθ
=
[
Hθ
H
]′
θ
− 1
θ2
[
1− 2c(θ−1)
(2−θ)2
]
−
[
Hθ
H
]′
s
, (D.3)
ds2
dθ
=
[
hθ
h
]′
θ
− 1
θ2
[
2
(
1− 2c(θ−1)
(2−θ)2
)
+ θ
2
(2−θ)2
]
−
[
hθ
h
]′
s
. (D.4)
17Using L’Hoˆptal’s rule we get lims→0

−Hθ
H

= lims→0

−hθ
h

= lims→0

−hθs
hs

> 0.
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While ds2
dθ
is undoubtedly positive, ds1
dθ
might be negative for large c and
large θ. We know that s1(2) < s2(2) = 1. If lims→0
[
hθs
hs
]
> 22−c we know that
s1(1) > s2(1). Thus, if s1(θ) and s2(θ) crosses this is at most once and the
constraint p = 0 is binding in the interval θ ∈ [1, θ˜], where θ˜ is the solution to
s1(θ) = s2(θ). θ˜ increases as the heterogeneity in mode of usage increases, and
θ˜ decreases with c.
Profit is concave in s given that
θ2
2
(2− θ)hs
[−hθ
h
−
1
θ
(
2−
θ − 2c
2− θ
)]
−
θ2
2
(2− θ)h
[hθ
h
]′
s
. ≤ 0
The last term is positive, hence profit is concave for s close to s2(θ). Since
the only other points satisfying ∂Π
∂s
= 0 is s = 0 and s = 1, s2(θ) constitutes a
maximum for profit.
At the same time, since p < c it is necessary to check that the firm obtains
positive profit on each type that it serves. Profit evaluated at p = 0 must be
nonnegative
1
2θ
2H − cxH − (2− θ)(θH + 12θ
2Hθ) ≥ 0.
Rewriting this, and combining it with condition (D.2) when this is binding
enable us to formulate the following implicit condition on (s, θ)[−Hθ
H
]
−
[−hθ
h
]
≥ 0.
Since we know that (D.1) is met while (D.2) is binding, the difference above is
given by[−Hθ
H
]
−
[−hθ
h
]
≥
1
θ
( θ − c
2− θ
− 1
)
≥ 0.
Hence, a sufficient condition for some type θ to be served is that
1
θ
( θ − c
2− θ
− 1
)
≥ 0 ⇒ θ ≥ 1 +
c
2
.
Finally, we need to show that V ′(θ) > 0 and that the solution is incentive
compatible. Knowing that s is increasing in θ, the second order condition for
global incentive compatibility is given by
θh+ 12θ
2hθ ≥ 0 ⇒
−hθ
h
≤
2
θ
.
Since we know that condition (D.2) is met this reduces to the condition that
2c− θ ≤ 0. If c ≤ 23 the tariff is implementable.
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The marginal information rent is positive under the condition that
−Hθ
H
≤
2
θ
.
Since (D.2) is binding we can subtract each side in the inequality above
and rewrite the condition as[−Hθ
H
]
−
[−hθ
h
]
≤
1
θ
[θ − 2c
2− θ
]
. (D.5)
Again, using the fact that (D.1) is met, while (D.2) is binding, we know
that V ′(θ) ≥ 0 if 1
θ
[
θ−c
2−θ − 1
]
≤ 1
θ
[
θ−2c
2−θ
]
. The condition reduces to 2 − c ≥ θ.
Altogether then, we must have that c ≤ min
{
θ
2 , 2 − θ
}
. Or, if we assume
that c ≤ 23 we have V
′(θ) > 0 with global incentive compatibility satisfied if
θ ≥ 1 + c2 .
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Figure 4 illustrates the conditions for the same θ with high (dashed lines)
and low (solid lines) heterogeneity in consumers’ mode of usage. With low
heterogeneity ∂Π(s, p)/∂p|p=0 is decreasing for s ∈ (0, s1) ((D.1) is satisfied).
However, ∂Π(s, p)/∂s|p=0 is increasing for s ∈ (0, s2) ((D.2) is satisfied). Thus,
with low heterogeneity, both constraints cannot be satisfied simultaneously.
With increased heterogeneity the figure shows that p = 0 is optimal for θ = 1.2.
D.3 Proof of Proposition 3
• Market coverage with p > 0.
The firm will serve a given consumer type θ if it is possible to satisfy the first
order condition for p ≤ θ. A necessary condition is that
lim
p→θ
[
(p− c)xpH − (2− θ)(ωθpH + ωpHθ)
]
≤ 0 ⇒ θ ≥ 1 + c2 .
Notice that this is independent of the level of s.
• Can the constraint s = 0 be binding with p > 0?
If profit increases for s close to zero when p approaches 1+ c2 , setting s = 0 can
never be an optimal choice.
lim
p→1+
c
2
[∂Π
∂s
]
= h
(
θ − 1− c2
)2(3
2 −
1
2(2− θ)
hθ
h
)
.
Because hθ ≤ 0 for low values of s, the limit value is positive for s close to 0.
Hence, the constraint s = 0 will not bind if the per unit charge is positive.
26
1,5
1
1
0,5
0
-0,5
−h˜θ
h˜
−hθ
h
−H˜θ
H˜
−Hθ
H
1
θ
1
θ
(
4−3θ
2−θ
)
s1 s˜1s˜2
s2
Figure 4: The constraints in (D.1) and (D.2) given that c = 0 and θ = 1.2,
with high (H˜) and low (H) heterogeneity in consumers’ usage patterns.
This proves part (i).
• Market coverage with p = 0?
An alternative strategy to exclude consumers in the low demand segment can
be to set s = 0 in the case that the constraint p = 0 is binding (i.e., s = 0 is
binding together with p = 0). This defines market coverage in the case that
p = 0. If s = 0 together with p = 0 conditions (D.1) and (D.2) are both satisfied
as s approaches zero, and we must have that
1
θ
(
1 +
c
2− θ
)
≤ lim
s→0
[−hθ
h
]
≤
1
θ
(
2−
θ − 2c
2− θ
)
. (D.6)
The largest possible θ must satisfy
1 +
c
2− θ
≤ 2−
θ − 2c
2− θ
⇒ θ ≤ 1 +
c
2
. (D.7)
We have already proved that profit is nonnegative given that θ > 1+ c2 if p = 0
is the optimal per unit charge. Hence, we can conclude that market coverage
in this case is also given by θ ≥ 1 + c2 .
This proves part (ii), and the proof of Proposition 3 is compete.
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D.4 Proof of Proposition 4
• Interior solution
If the per unit charge is determined by ∂Π
∂p
= 0, this is given by
p− c = (1− F )
(
1 +
xHθ
H
)
. (D.8)
For x > 0 and s > 0 the left hand side will belong to the interval [0, 1 − F ]
(the term
(
1+ xHθ
H
)
can never exceed 1 under the assumption about first order
stochastic dominance). Hence, p−c ≤ 1−F , which is the distortion a monopoly
would apply if s = 1.
In an interior solution, for θ ∈ (θ˜, θ′), the per unit charge p∗ and the usage
restriction s∗ is determined according to the two conditions
−Hθ
H
=
1
θ − p
(
1−
p− c
2− θ
)
, (D.9)
−hθ
h
=
1
θ − p
(
2−
θ + p− 2c
2− θ
)
=
1
θ − p
(
1−
p− c
2− θ
−
2θ − 2− c
2− θ
)
.
(D.10)
Let (D.9) define a function s1(p; θ) and (D.10) define a function s2(p; θ). Holding
θ fixed, we can determine ds/dp along the two conditions by differentiating (D.9)
and (D.10) with respect to p and s. We find
ds1
dp
=
1[
Hθ
H
]′
s
[
2θ − 2− c
(2− θ)(θ − p)2
]
≥ 0,
ds2
dp
=
1[
hθ
h
]′
s
[
2(2θ − 2− c)
(2− θ)(θ − p)2
]
≥ 0.
Next, for θ ≥ θ˜ we have that s2 ≥ s1 as p approaches zero. On the other
hand, if s approaches 1 condition (D.9) are satisfied if p = c + 2 − θ, whereas
(D.10) only can be satisfied if p is infinitively positive. Given the slopes above
s1(θ) and s2(θ) crosses exactly once for p ∈ [0, c+ 2− θ].
Since it is clear that we only have one stationary point it is sufficient
to check that the second order conditions for profit maximization is satisfied
close to the optimum. Under the assumption that we can cancel all first order
conditions, we can write the second order conditions as
∂2Π
∂p2
= −H
(
1 + (2− θ)
Hθ
H
)
≤ 0,
∂2Π
∂s2
= −12x
2h(2− θ)
[hθ
h
]′
s
≤ 0.
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Given (D.9), a sufficient condition for profit to be concave in p is that
1/(2 − θ) ≥ 1/(θ − p)[1 − (p − c)/(2 − θ)]. This is met whenever θ ≥ 1 + c/2.
Profit is concave in s everywhere since all terms are nonnegative. The last
condition is that
∂2Π
∂p2
∂2Π
∂s2
−
( ∂2Π
∂s∂p
)2
= 12x
2h
{
H(2− θ)
(
1 + (2− θ)Hθ
H
)[
hθ
h
]′
s
− 12h
(
1 + (2− θ)hθ
h
)2}
≥ 0.
Given (D.9) and (D.10) this can be simplified further
1
2h
2(θ − p)(2θ − 2− c)
(
H
h
(2− θ)
[
hθ
h
]′
s
− 2
(2θ − 2− c
θ − p
))
≥ 0.
By inspection, it is easy to confirm that this is positive as long as s is
above some threshold s¯(θ), where s¯(θ) is increasing in θ.18 s¯ approaches 1
when θ approaches 2, and s(1) > 0. Note that both terms inside the bracket
parenthesis are nonnegative for 1 + c2 < θ < 2, and 0 < s < 1, it is 0 for s = 0
and ∞ for s = 1. The first term is increasing in s, while the second term is
constant. The sign of the determinant of the Hessian cannot be determined
in general. However, we have not been able to construct a numerical example
where it is not positive at (p∗, s∗).
Next, in order to rule out countervailing incentives, the information rent
must be increasing in θ. V ′θ ≥ 0 if xH
(
1 + 12x
Hθ
H
)
≥ 0. This implies that
−Hθ
H
≤ 2
θ−p . When (D.9) is binding it is sufficient that
2
θ−p ≥
1
θ−p
(
1 − p−c2−θ
)
.
This is satisfied if p ≥ c− (2− θ). When p is determined by (D.9) this is true
for θ ∈ [1 + c2 , 2].
19
Finally, the second order conditions for global incentive compatibility must
be satisfied. Differentiating (D.9) and (D.10) yields
ds∗
dθ
=
[
hθ
h
]′
θ
− 2
[
Hθ
H
]′
θ
− 1
(2−θ)2
2
[
Hθ
H
]′
s
−
[
hθ
h
]′
s
≥ 0,
18By differentiating the condition 1
2
h2(θ− p)(2θ− 2− c)

H
h
(2− θ)

hθ
h
′
s
− 2

2θ−2−c
θ−p

= 0
we find that ds/dθ > 0.
19Solving the first order condition for p we find that p =
c+(2−θ)
 
1+θ
Hθ
H

1+
 
2−θ

Hθ
H
.
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dp∗
dθ
=
1(
2
[
Hθ
H
]′
s
−
[
hθ
h
]′
s
)
(2− θ)(2θ − 2− c)
×
{(
2
[
Hθ
H
]′
s
−
[
hθ
h
]′
s
)(
(p− 2θ + 2)(p− c)− (2− θ)2
)
− (2− θ)2(θ − p)2
([
Hθ
H
]′
θ
[
hθ
h
]′
s
−
[
Hθ
H
]′
s
[
hθ
h
]′
θ
)
−
[
Hθ
H
]′
s
(θ − p)2
}
R 0.
To prove that the first sign above is correct, let us differentiate the first
order conditions in (D.9) and (D.10), holding s fixed. This gives
dp1
dθ
=
[Hθ
H
]′
θ
[
(2− θ)(θ − p)2
2θ − 2− c
]
≤ 0,
dp2
dθ
=
[hθ
h
]′
θ
[
(2− θ)(θ − p)2
2(2θ − 2− c)
]
≤ 0.
For a solution to exist it must be the case that s1(p) crosses s2(p) from
below, and that p1(θ) crosses p2(θ) from below. Hence
ds1
dp
≥ ds2
dp
and dp1
dθ
≥ dp2
dθ
.
These two conditions are met if
2
[Hθ
H
]′
s
−
[hθ
h
]′
s
≤ 0,
[hθ
h
]′
θ
− 2
[Hθ
H
]′
θ
≤ 0.
This proves that s∗ is increasing in θ. The term Vθs is positive if p > 2c−θ,
which is always the case when c < 23 . Hence, the second term in the sufficient
condition for global incentive compatibility is positive.
If the first term is positive as well, the tariffs are implementable. The term
Vθp > 0 if p > c (Vθp < 0 if p < c). If p is close to c the term is close to zero
and can be ignored. Because p can be both above and below c and because the
sign of p′(θ) cannot be determined in general, it is more ambiguous whether the
first term is positive. However, as θ increases above θ˜, the derivative can change
sign at most once, and then from positive to negative, p′(θ) < 0 for θ very close
to 2. If p < c it must be the case that p(θ) is increasing, and the first term is
positive. On the other hand, since Vθs
ds∗
dθ
is strictly positive, a solution where
Vθp
dp∗
dθ
< 0 can be implementable. We have not been able to solve a numerical
example with the given distributions where the second order condition is not
satisfied.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
D.5 Proof of Proposition 5 and 6
Proposition 5 can be verified by going through the proofs for Propositions 1
to 4, replacing the first order conditions for the monopoly problem with the
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appropriate first order conditions for welfare maximization. The proofs are
omitted here. For convenience we state the conditions that must be met in the
case that p = 0 is binding, and the first order conditions in an interior solution.
For p = 0 to be a binding condition we must have that
−Hθ
H
≥
1
θ
(
1 +
(1 + λ
λ
) c
2− θ
)
, (D.11)
−hθ
h
≤
1
θ
(
2−
(1 + λ
λ
)θ − 2c
2− θ
)
. (D.12)
For λ > 0 the left hand side in (D.11) is shifted upwards relative to equation
(D.1), while the left hand side in (D.12) is shifted downwards relative to equa-
tion (D.2). It is easy to confirm that both constraints above cannot be satisfied
for θ = θ˜ (as defined in Proposition 2), except for when λ→∞. Hence, pw > 0
for θ = θ˜. Let θ˜W be defined the same way as θ˜. Then it is easy to confirm that
θ˜W ≪ θ˜, and that θ˜W → θ˜ when λ→∞. In fact, λ must be large for p = 0 to
bind in any interval at all, so that θ˜W < 1 in all relevant cases.
In an interior solution, we must have that
−Hθ
H
=
1
θ − p
(
1−
(1 + λ
λ
)p− c
2− θ
)
, (D.13)
−hθ
h
=
1
θ − p
(
2−
(1 + λ
λ
)θ + p− 2c
2− θ
)
. (D.14)
It is easy to confirm that both conditions cannot be satisfied at (p∗, s∗) solv-
ing profit maximization. Consumption efficiency increases if Q(p(θ), s(θ), θ) >
Q(c+ 2− θ, 1, θ). A necessary condition for this is that
H(s(θ)|θ) >
2θ − c− 2
θ − p(θ)
.
If θ is close to 1 + c2 it is sufficient that s(θ) > 0. The condition will also hold
if s is close to 1 since p < c+2− θ. In the case that p = 0 binds, the condition
defines a lower bound for s(θ), θ ∈ [1 + c2 , θ˜〉. Otherwise, the condition states
a restriction on (p(θ), s(θ)) for θ ∈ [θ˜, 2〉. Numerical simulation confirms that
the condition is satisfied everywhere.
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